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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
\ppd ln* l "ruvvAppi II,ml * Atk" Willi s Mi div al ( i nU i ( llic i luspilal ) submits this 
reply to the answer of Appellant/Cross-Appellee Lori n a a * , ; ; .• . 
with a reply to Haase's answer to the arguments of the Hospital . The Hospital then provides 
a response to new issues raised by Haase in her reply brief, offered only if the Court declines 
tl le I lospital's cc : i icn u i ei it i 1 r : : ;ti :: i i tc sit iki . n lei its. 
R E P L Y A R G U M E N T S 
I. 
H A A S E D O E S N O T R E F U T E T H E H O S P I T A L ' S 
A R G U M E N T T H A T DR. H A W K E S ? P E R S O N A L 
M E D I C A L R E C O R D S S H O U I ,D N O T IT A A T B E E N 
A D M I T T E D 
A. Haase Misrepresents the Record in Arguing That Because Dr. Madsen Believed 
Dr. Hawkes W a s Impaired, Agency Theory Imparts That Belief to the Hospital. 
Haase argues tlla! because I )i Madsen was a member of the Medical Executive 
Coi i iniifUv and ( io\ cminj.' Mi uinrl \s lit m I )i 11 iw k r H\^ ,^i* inili;ill\ u u l u i l i a k d 111 I 'N.l. his 
knowledge of Dr. Hawkes ' alleged impairment should be impuicc y 
Brief at 2. That issue need not be reached, however, as the record unequivocally shows that 
I >i \ 1.1'iilscn iiii/u i in, lit/u/tl llut 111, I lawkes had an impairment which caused him l o b e 
dangerous or a threat to paticnh; 
The most significant misrepresentation here lies in Haase's failure to acki lowledge Dr. 
Madsen's testimony that he did rn»t. J -ur lime piioi m Ap-"" ^: ii:>0? believe that Dr. 
1 la *vkes • wi is \ t tl n c ; it ti tl ic • s< i l ety ( >i patients a; \\u Hospital. Transcript at 1116. lii les 1- 4. 
_]„ 
Haase asserts: "If the Hospital didn't know what Dr. Madsen knew, it should have known. 
If it was ignorant, its ignorance was the fault of its own agent and medical staff member." 
Reply Brief at 2. Haase would have the Court believe that Dr. Madsen considered Dr. 
Hawkes to be a danger to patients and failed to disclose that to the Hospital. At no point, 
however, does she explicitly argue that Dr. Madsen felt Dr. Hawkes was a danger to patients. 
This is true notwithstanding the attempt to mischaracterize the military discharge 
disability issue. Reply Brief at 2. Again, Haase neglects to point out testimony of Dr. 
Madsen which defeats her characterization of the facts. Haase persisted in asserting that Dr. 
Hawkes was "rated 90% disabled." Reply Brief at 3. Dr. Madsen testified that a 90 percent 
disability rating from the military does not mean that Dr. Hawkes was 90 percent disabled, 
it means that 90 percent of whatever disability he might have is military service-related. 
Transcript at 1115, lines 14-23. 
At no point in the record does Haase establish that Dr. Madsen formed an opinion that 
Dr. Hawkes was a danger to patients, or that he considered Dr. Hawkes to be 90% disabled. 
Any characterization to the contrary misrepresents Dr. Madsen's testimony and his actions. 
As there is no evidence that Dr. Madsen held such opinions, the argument that the Hospital 
should be charged, on an agency theory, with knowledge of opinions never held is an 
irrelevant non sequitur. 
B. Haase Incorrectly Asserts That Repeated Objections Are Necessary to Preserve 
an Issue. 
Haase concedes that the Hospital objected to the introduction of the personal medical 
records of Dr. Thomas Hawkes. Reply Brief at 5. She then asserts that the Hospital did not 
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make a subsequent objection, with the unsupported and incorrect presumption "apparently, 
the Hospital was as convinced as the Court that the necessary foundation for admission of 
the records had been established by Dr. Madsen's testimony." Reply Brief at 5. 
Haase cites no authority nor offers any legal analysis supporting the proposition that 
continued objections must be on the record in order to preserve the issue. She merely asserts 
that the objection was waived because it wasn't offered multiple times. Such an unsupported 
conclusory argument should be rejected. 
C. Haase Misunderstands the Issue When She Asserts That the Hospital Was 
Aware of the Contents of Dr. Hawkes' Personal Medical Records in 1999. 
The basis for objection to the admission or use of Dr. Hawkes1 medical records was 
that the Hospital had not seen, nor had any reason to see, these records prior to the surgery 
on Mrs. Haase in early 1996. Appellee's Brief at 8-9. Dr. Madsen testified that he did not 
consider Dr. Hawkes to be a threat to the safety of patients (Transcript at 1116, lines 1 -4) and 
Haase offers no authority for her implication that the Hospital should have forced Dr. 
Hawkes to produce his medical records prior to April of 1996 in order to question the 
medical judgment of Dr. Madsen. 
As Haase offers no analysis of relevant authority in her answer, the Hospital responds 
by reiterating that there is no authority before this Court, nor was there any before the trial 
court, which establishes that the Hospital had any duty to demand that Dr. Hawkes produce 
his personal medical records prior to 1996. Absent any legal duty, there can be no breach of 
duty. The decision to admit the records (and to allow literally hours of discussion of the 
-3-
contents) without establishing that the Hospital should have known what was in those 
records, was more prejudicial than probative and was reversible error. 
D. The Argument That the Use of Dr. Hawkes' Personal Medical Records by Dr. 
Pasternak at Trial Was Not a Major Factor" is Disingenuous and Incorrect. 
It has been consistently asserted that had the Hospital been able to argue to the jury 
that Dr. Pasternak never met Dr. Hawkes, never interviewed his treating physicians, and 
never reviewed any of his medical records, his credibility in making the medical 
determination that Dr. Hawkes was dangerous would have been undermined. Appellee's 
Brief at 11. Indeed, Dr. Pasternak was the only witness who appeared in person before the 
jury with testimony that Dr. Hawkes was probably an unsafe physician when he operated on 
Lori Haase. Haase is disingenuous because she made much of the significance of the records 
at trial and in closing argument. Transcript at 1517, lines 13-18. 
It was error to allow admission of the records at trial. Dr. Pasternak could not be 
deposed regarding his opinion of the records, Dr. Madsen could not be deposed regarding 
his opinion of the records, and there was no notice to allow the defense to obtain expert 
review or opinion. 
Haase also asserts "there was nothing preventing the Hospital from trying to retain an 
expert to testify that Dr. Madsen's illuminating treatment records do not reflect treatment of 
a dangerously impaired surgeon." Reply Brief at 7-8. This too is disingenuous because even 
Haase did not know until after the trial had started that Dr. Madsen's records would be 
produced. Reply Brief at 6, n.3. The records were produced because of the efforts of 
counsel for another plaintiff in another case and were only made available to Haase because 
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the Court felt that was appropriate. Transcript at 36, lines 21-25 and at 37, lines 1-12. Haase 
was by coincidence able to benefit; had she not retained a credentialing expert (Dr. 
Pasternak) who was also a physician, she could not have taken full advantage of the 
unexpected order of the trial court.1 
The suggestion that the Hospital, after the start of trial, could have secured an 
appropriate expert to review the records is frivolous, but even if that were theoretically 
possible it would not refute the threshold arguments that there was no foundation for 
testimony about the records and that their introduction was more prejudicial than probative. 
Haase substantially misrepresents the record when she describes as "meritless" the 
Hospital's allegation that "production of Dr. Madsen's records was ordered only in another 
case." Reply Brief at 6 (citing Brief of Appellee at 7). The Hospital did not state, either on 
page 7 or anywhere else, that the records were only ordered produced in another case. 
The Hospital's point here is that it was more than unfair surprise to the Hospital that 
the records were produced, Haase had done nothing to secure their production other than 
send a subpoena to Dr. Madsen just before trial. The Court, without discussion of the reason 
for its decision, announced from the bench that because of a ruling it intended to make in 
another case, it was appropriate to order Dr. Madsen to turn over his medical records to 
Haase. Transcript at 37, lines 1-8. 
1
 A second coincidence is relevant: the order was only available at trial because 
Judge Cornaby happened to be assigned both of the cases in question. 
-5-
The Court: . . . I have here two different folders from last Wednesday when that 
was argued, and that was in Hatch versus Dr. Hawkes and Ashley 
Valley Medical Center. 
It's my intention to order Dr. Madsen to reveal those to Counsel for 
Hatch . . . .So verbally the others haven't got notice yet, but they will 
get notice, and I see no reason to not make the same ruling in this case. 
Transcript at 36-37, lines 22-25 and at 37, lines 1-8. 
As Haase did nothing during the discovery process to compel the production of Dr. 
Madsen's records, indeed did not even attempt to subpoena those records until just before 
trial, the Hospital had no reason to suspect that they would be admitted into evidence and 
therefore had no reason to attempt to review them or to engage an expert to counter any 
opinions that might be offered about them. The trial court, in making a key ruling in this case 
based upon motions filed and arguments heard in another case, committed reversible error. 
II. 
HAASE IS INCORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT PRIOR 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF DR. HAWKES WAS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER SEVERAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
HEARSAY RULE. 
A. The Testimony of Dr. Hawkes Was Not Admissible under Rule 803(3). 
Haase asserts that Rule 803(3) makes Dr. Hawkes' testimony in 1997 regarding his 
physical condition or health "expressly admissible" as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Reply Brief at 10. Haase offers no authority and no legal analysis, and her conclusory 
argument substantially misstates the law. 
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The Supreme Court of Utah addressed this question in 1999 in a case Haase fails to 
discuss. State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999). Rule 803(3) allows admission only of 
statements of a declarant's "then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition." kL at 408 
(quoting Utah R.Evid. 803(3)). In Jaeger, a witness's statements were with respect to her 
condition prior to the time at which the testimony was offered. IdL at 409. The Court made 
clear that Rule 803(3) does not allow the admission of testimony other than a declarant's 
"then existing state of mind." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, Rule 803(3) expressly excludes 
"a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed . . . ." IcL 
(quoting Utah R.Evid. 803(3)). 
Dr. Hawkes' deposition testimony in 1997 would be admissible (if at all) under Rule 
803(3) only to establish his state of mind or medical condition on the day he gave the 
testimony, fourteen months after the surgery on Lori Haase. It is not admissible to establish 
his condition or state of mind in March or April of 1996. Moreover, some of the testimony 
was not about his physical or mental condition and would not be admissible under even the 
most liberal construction of Rule 803(3). 
The deposition is not admissible under Rule 803(3). 
B. Haase Offers No Authority for Her Argument That Dr. Hawkes' Statements 
Were Admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). 
Haase argues that Dr. Hawkes' deposition should be admitted pursuant to Rule 
804(b)(3). Reply Brief at 10-11. She asserts that Dr. Hawkes' statements "were so far 
against his interest" that they should be admitted. Reply Brief at 11. 
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The first legal impediment is that the application of Rule 804(b)(3) requires that 
declarant be aware that he is making a statement against his interest. Roberts v. City of Troy, 
773 F.2d 725, 729 (6th Cir. 1985). Without a showing of that requisite awareness, the 
exception cannot apply. Id. 
Haase does not offer evidence that Dr. Hawkes knew at the time of his deposition 
that statements he made regarding his health care and military history would be against his 
interest. Indeed, if Dr. Hawkes had given any thought to the significance of statements he 
made regarding his medical condition, he might have concluded that it was in his interest to 
explain the extent to which he was taking medication under a physician's care rather than 
more informally or even illicitly. If it did occur to Dr. Hawkes that rumors of his use of 
medication might be used against him in his malpractice case, he may have been motivated 
to show that his use was only on the direction of responsible physicians after thorough 
evaluation of his condition. 
This interpretation is more likely than the interpretation that he made statements 
regarding his medical history knowing that they were against his interest. The record 
supports the conclusion that it is much more likely that Dr. Hawkes made these statements 
intending to clear rumors and allegations against his character or reputation or medical 
condition, and that he felt they were helpful rather than being against his interest. The 
deposition testimony of Dr. Hawkes includes the following passage: 
Question: Okay. Have you ever had any drug or substance addiction problem or 
attended a clinic for that sort of thing? 
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Answer: I was - when I had my neck surgery, I came back and people were -
accused me of going into a drug rehabilitation. It greatly upset me. So 
I went down and had myself drug tested and put myself in a drug clinic. 
Question: Now. wait a second. People accused you of what? 
Answer: They accused me of going to Texas to go through a withdrawal 
problem. 
Question: And you didn't. You went down there -
Answer: I went down to get my neck surgery, but I came back and that was the 
word in town. So I thought I could clear myself. So I went down, and 
I enrolled in one of the drug programs. First of all, I talked with the 
addictionologist. I was very concerned of the accusation. Together we 
decided, "Well, let's go ahead and put you in for four days." They put 
me in for four days. 
Transcript at 455, lines 21-25 and at 456, lines 1-16. 
Later, in his deposition testimony. Dr. Hawkes provides additional evidence that his 
disclosures were intended to clear his reputation: "And again, I just did that. I did it 
voluntarily. I just wanted to clear myself." Transcript at 458, lines 2-3. It is illogical to 
suggest that an individual who explicitly states that he is making efforts to clear his name 
makes those statements knowing, or even assuming, that they are against his interest. Such 
an argument turns common sense on its head. 
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In addition, the Court erred in allowing entire sections of the deposition to be read into 
the record. Rule 804(b)(3) does not allow unrestricted introduction of entire sections of a 
proceeding just because some statements in that proceeding may be against the interest of the 
declarant. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2435 (1994). The 
Supreme Court was clear in its analysis: 
Nothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or the general theory of the hearsay Rules 
suggests that admissibility should turn on whether a statement is collateral to 
a self-inculpatory statement. The fact that a statement is self-inculpatory does 
make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a self-
inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's 
reliability. We see no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are 
neutral as to interest. . . should be treated any differently from other hearsay 
statements that are generally excluded. 
114 S.Ct. at 2435. 
The court stated clearly that Rule 804(b)(3) "does not allow admission of non-self-
inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-
inculpatory." Id The court also found that this principle "is especially true when the 
statement implicates someone else." Id. 
In this case, therefore, although the Hospital argues that Dr. Hawkes did not 
knowingly make statements against his interest and therefore that none of his statements 
should have been a dmitted, even a finding that he knowingly made self-inculpatory 
statements would only allow the admission of statements which were explicitly and directly 
against his interest, thus the introduction of complete sections of his deposition was error. 
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C. The Exception of Rule 804(b)(1) Does Not Apply Because Counsel for Dr. 
Hawkes Did Not Have an Identical Motive to Develop or Clarify Dr. Hawkes' 
Testimony. 
Haase asserts that the Hospital cannot meet the burden of "establishing a lack of 
similar motive of a witness examination . . . . " Reply Brief at 12. Haase also characterizes 
Dr. Hawkes' testimony as "made in a civil action in which he was attempting to defeat 
liability by demonstrating he was a fit and able surgeon." Reply Brief at 12. This is a 
conclusory mischaracterization of the facts. Haase offers no evidence that, in the sections 
of the deposition she offered, Dr. Hawkes was attempting to demonstrate his fitness and 
ability. She offers no authority for the implied assertion that fitness and ability are even 
elements of a medical malpractice action. 
The deposition was taken in a case which was exclusively a medical malpractice 
action, and the issue in such actions is whether there was a breach of the standard of care, not 
why there may have been such a breach. Accordingly, had the matter gone to trial, the 
admissibility of any information related to why Dr. Hawkes might have committed a breach 
of the standard of care could have been challenged by his counsel. When the deposition was 
taken, the parties anticipated that Dr. Hawkes would be present at trial, and counsel for Dr. 
Hawkes had no reason to aggressively pursue evidentiary objections, he was only motivated 
to make objections appropriate to the more liberal rules of discovery. 
In support of her argument that the Hawkes deposition would be admissible under 
Rule 804(b)(1), Haase offers New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 888 F.2d 646 
(10th Cir. 1989). Haase offers no citation to a particular page or section of the case, nor does 
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she provide any discussion of the rule of the case or analysis of its application to the facts 
here. However, the case does stand for a proposition central to the Hospital's argument. The 
holding, rather than affirming a predecessor-in-interest claim, was to reject that claim 
because there was no evidence that counsel for the party making the statement in question 
was disposed to protect the interest of the other party. Jd. at 652. 
The court concluded that where there is no explicit disposition to protect the interests 
of other parties, there can be no "like motive" and therefore no finding that the party offering 
the statement was a predecessor in interest. Id. The court also rejected without comment the 
argument that the statements could have been admitted under the residual exception of Rule 
804(b)(5). 14 
The case is explicit in its interpretation of the Rule to require "like motive to develop 
testimony about the same material facts" as the necessary basis for establishing a predecessor 
in interest. Id (quoting Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1187 (3rd Cir. 
1978)). The core of the Hospital's argument on this issue always has been that the facts 
necessary to establish a claim of medical malpractice in a case against Dr. Hawkes are not 
the same material facts as those necessary to establish a case of negligence in credentialing 
against Ashley Valley Medical Center. In argument for its Motion in Limine to exclude the 
deposition of Dr. Hawkes, the Hospital asserted "the hospital and the physician have separate 
and distinct legal interests, and indeed the plaintiff has brought separate and distinct legal 
claims against the hospital and the physician. The claim for Dr. Hawkes was for negligence 
in the performance of medical care, the claim against the hospital is for negligence in its 
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administrative functions prior to the provision of that medical care." Memorandum 
Supporting Motion in Limine at 7. 
For the Hospital, the material facts are with respect to the credentialing and retention 
of the surgeon. For the separate medical malpractice case against the surgeon, the material 
facts were those establishing whether the surgeon breached the standard of care. There is no 
authority supporting the implication that the material facts in these distinct causes of action 
are the same. Issues of concern to the Hospital, issues such as developing testimony 
regarding the circumstances under which Dr. Hawkes chose to be evaluated in the Day 
Spring Program, or the specifics of any involvement the Hospital had in his treatment for 
pain, or the extent to which he disclosed his medical condition to the Hospital, are all matters 
which are suggested by his deposition in various places but which counsel for Dr. Hawkes 
had no motive to develop or clarify as they had no relevance to the elements of the tort of 
medical malpractice. 
D. Haase Offers No Case Law Supporting Her Assertion That the Residual 
Exceptions of Rules 803 and 804 Should Apply. 
Although Haase offers Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5)2, the analysis is identical as 
the rules differ only in that Rule 804(b)(5) applies only when the declarant is unavailable. 
Utah v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 4325 440 (Utah 1989). Haase offers no authority for her 
argument that the residual exceptions of 803(24) and 804(b)(5) are applicable, despite the 
availability of recent Utah appellate court opinions on this issue. 
2
 Haase repeatedly refers to Rule 804(5). Reply Brief at 13. The Hospital assumes 
this is an incorrect reference to Rule 804(b)(5). 
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Haase neglects to discuss or even to acknowledge the procedural requirement that the 
companion residual exceptions found in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) require "concurrent 
notice that a proponent intends to rely on one of the residual exceptions." State v. Webster, 
32 P.3d 976, 981-982 (Utah App. 2001). Haase ignores an explicit requirement in the final 
sentence of the rule: "[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and 
address of the declarant." Id. (quoting Utah R.Evid. 804(b)(5)). Failure to give pretrial 
notice of the intent to rely upon either of the residual exceptions defeats the availability of 
either exception and admission of testimony under those exceptions would be reversible 
error. LI at 983. 
The Hospital concedes that Haase mentioned the residual exceptions in a reply to a 
motion in limine, but the reference did not state her intent to rely upon those exceptions and 
was offered only as an additional defense. At no time did she make an affirmative statement 
of her intent to rely on the residual exceptions with the required specificity regarding the 
statement to be offered. Jd. at 982. 
As conceded by Haase, the "catch all" exceptions apply only to "a statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions . . . ." Reply Brief at 13 (quoting 
Rule 803(24)). As argued above, statements made by Dr. Hawkes of his prior mental state 
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and physical condition are specifically excluded by Rule 803(3). Therefore, they are 
specifically covered by a foregoing exception and Rule 803(24) cannot apply. 
Rule 804(b)(5) does not allow admission of evidence covered by other Rules. The 
Rules explicitly exclude hearsay testimony regarding health conditions, existing prior to the 
testimony, and the legislative history makes clear the intent that the residuals not be used to 
circumvent an otherwise applicable restriction. As this Court recently noted in affirming a 
narrow construction of the residual exceptions, Utah courts "look to the reason, spirit and 
sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute 
dealing with the subject." 32 P.3d at 983 (quoting Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co. v. 
Pavne. 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989)). 
The intended limitation of a trial court's discretion when allowing admissibility under 
the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule is clearly articulated in the Advisory Committee's 
Note to the Rules. "Exception 24 and its companion provision in Rule 804(b)(5)... do not 
contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating new 
and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate trustworthiness within the spirit of 
the specifically stated exceptions." 2 John Strong et al, McCormick on Evidence, Appendix 
A at 647 (5th ed. 1999). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report on the Federal Rules 
of Evidence expressed a similar view of the restrictive intent of the residual exception: 
"It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and 
only in exceptional circumstances. The Committee does not intend to establish 
a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall 
within one of the other exceptions contained in Rule 803 and 804(b) It is 
intended that in any case in which evidence is sought to be admitted under 
these subsections, the trial judge will exercise no less care, reflection and 
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caution than the courts did under the common law in establishing the now-
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule." 
McCormick, supra. Appendix A at 649. 
The text and the legislative history of the residual exceptions establish that they 
do not apply to the admission of Dr. Hawkes' deposition. 
III. 
HAASE DOES NOT REFUTE THE HOSPITAL'S 
ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS INADEQUATE 
FOUNDATION TO ADMIT MANUAL DEXTERITY TEST 
RESULTS AND THAT THOSE RESULTS WERE MORE 
PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE. 
The Hospital objected to the introduction of the dexterity test results on the grounds 
that there was no foundation "establishing that the test in 1997 was reliable as a reflection 
of Dr. Hawkes' condition two to four years earlier, or indeed at any time in the past." Brief 
of Appellee at 15. The Hospital's appellate argument concisely asserts: "Absent any expert 
testimony that connects the 1997 test result with some reliable determination of Dr. Hawkes' 
manual dexterity on the day of the surgery on Haase in 1996, the results are more prejudicial 
than probative and leave the jury to speculate as to their significance." Brief of Appellee at 
15-16. 
Haase does not address this argument, indeed she does not even acknowledge the 
argument. Her answer focuses on whether the test results are hearsay, and even as to this 
assertion she offers no citation to authority, no analysis, only the conclusory assertion that 
the test cannot be hearsay because it was videotaped. Reply Brief at 14. 
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Haase does not refute the Hospital's argument that, absent expert testimony connecting 
the test results to the condition of Dr. Hawkes prior to the surgery, there is inadequate 
foundation to present the results to the jury. 
IV. 
HAASE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE CORE OF THE 
HOSPITAL'S ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
TESTIMONY OF DR. PAULOS. 
The Hospital, in addition to its general objection to testimony by videotape, argues 
that the testimony of Dr. Paulos in its entirety should not have been admitted. Appellee's 
Brief at 18-19. 
Haase contends that the only objection to videotaped testimony is to the testimony of 
Dr. Richard Jackson. Reply Brief at 16. This contention is disingenuous, however, as Haase 
is well aware that there were persistent objections both on and off the record to having any 
of these witnesses appear by videotape. The record supports this assertion: 
The Court: I'm concerned about all of these being done by either telephone or 
video. I haven't agreed to it. Counsel apparently hasn't agreed to it 
If you were going to talk about substantive things he would require 
them to be here. 
Transcript at 467, lines 19-25. 
Additional perspective on the true context in which these objections are raised arises 
shortly thereafter: 
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The Court: Is this what's going to happen with all of these; you're going to 
offer and you're going to object to them? 
The Court: How many are we going to have this problem with tapes on? 
Mr. Mortensen: This is the last tape. 
The Court: And then the others we have are telephone conferences? 
Mr. Mortensen: Two of those. They are expected to be brief. 
The Court: And we'll show your - I assume you are objecting? 
Mr. Harrison: Yes? Your Honor. I continue to object. The Court knows my 
objection and my position. 
Transcript at 468, lines 17-19 and at 469, lines 9-13. 
This section of the transcript makes clear that the Hospital consistently objected to the 
use of videotapes and that Haase was well aware of those consistent objections. For her to 
suggest now that the objection was with respect to only one videotape is misleading. 
Haase makes no reply to the Hospital's analysis of case law which requires that 
videotapes be edited. Indeed, she offers no authority or legal analysis whatsoever. She 
offers no rebuttal to the Hospital's claim that it was more prejudicial than probative to allow 
the jury to hear an extended discussion by Dr. Paulos of what he would have said had he been 
asked, with no foundation establishing that the Hospital had an obligation to ask, or even a 
reason to ask. 
Haase does not refute the argument of lack of foundation or of prejudice greater than 
probative value. 
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V. 
HAASE OFFERS NO AUTHORITY IN REBUTTAL TO 
THE HOSPITAL'S ARGUMENT THAT DR. MARGARET 
ENSIGN WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY AS AN 
EXPERT WITNESS. 
Haase offers no contrary authority, indeed does not even engage in criticism of the 
Hospital's analysis of relevant authority supporting its argument that Dr. Margaret Ensign 
should not have been allowed to testify as an expert witness on physician impairment. Haase 
merely repeats the testimony of Dr. Ensign at trial with no legal analysis. Reply Brief at 22. 
Haase asserts that there is no basis for concluding that Dr. Ensign's testimony that Dr. 
Hawkes was impaired made any difference to the outcome of the trial. Reply Brief at 23. 
This assertion is based on the gross misrepresentation that "Dr. Ensign was only one of some 
20 witnesses to offer opinions and observations as to the surgeon's apparent impairment." 
Reply Brief at 23. Haase offers no citation to the record in support of that claim. In fact, Dr. 
Ensign was one of only three witnesses to testify that Dr. Hawkes was or may have been 
impaired when he operated on Lori Haase.3 
3
 Adequate citations to the record are prohibited here by space constraints and by 
reason. However, only six witnesses commented on observations regarding Dr. Hawkes. 
Drs. Pasternak, Stryker and Ensign testified that they believe Dr. Hawkes either was or 
may have been impaired when he operated on Lori Haase. Kathy Hawkins testified that 
she saw Dr. Hawkes on one occasion at a football game when she believed he was not 
sober, and former employees Holly Kurtz and Elvira Bullock said that on one or two 
occasions, while working for Dr. Hawkes in his private office, they considered his speech 
to be slurred. The attempt of Haase to mislead this Court by stating that 20 witnesses 
offered opinions and observations regarding the apparent impairment of Dr. Hawkes does 
not serve the interest of justice. 
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One witness testified that she saw Dr. Hawkes attempt to enter a high school football 
game when exhibiting behaviors which led her to conclude that he was not sober. Transcript 
at 285, lines 8-10. Two other witnesses, both of whom were working for Dr. Hawkes in his 
private office practice, testified that on one or two occasions, perhaps at the same time, they 
believed that Dr. Hawkes had slurred speech. Transcript at 573, lines 5-10; Transcript at 
352, lines 2-16. 
The Hospital does not agree that "a couple" of instances of perceived slurred speech 
over a three-year period and one appearance at a football game, apparently having consumed 
alcohol, constitute evidence of apparent impairment. However, even if Haase is given the 
benefit of great latitude in interpreting that testimony, there are a total of six witnesses who 
testified about opinions and observations of alleged impairment prior to the surgery on 
Haase, not twenty. This kind of misrepresentation of the record does not assist the Court of 
Appeals in reviewing the issues. 
VI. 
HAASE DOES NOT REFUTE THE HOSPITAL'S 
ARGUMENT THAT REFERENCES TO THE DAY 
SPRING RECORDS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Haase does not refute, indeed completely ignores, the argument that without adequate 
foundation the Day Spring records should not have been discussed in front of the jury. She 
does, however, assert that the Hospital failed to identify "any particular passage from the trial 
record containing a reversibly erroneous reference to the surgeon's treatment at Day Spring." 
Although the Hospital does not know what precisely Haase means by the phrase "reversibly 
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erroneous reference" and is not assisted by the presentation of any case law by Haase, the 
assertion that the Hospital failed to identify any passage which it considered to be prejudicial 
error is false. 
There are multiple citations to the record showing the Hospital's objection at trial to 
any reference to the Day Spring records. Brief of Appellee at 24, 25. The Hospital also 
objected, and was twice sustained, in its objection to the characterization by counsel of Day 
Spring as a "drug addiction clinic." Transcript at 805, lines 13-17. 
More specifically, the Hospital not only provides a citation, but quotes a passage of 
the record in which the Hospital specifically objected to allowing a plaintiffs witness to 
quote from Day Spring records. Appellee's Brief at 26. The specificity of the Hospital's 
argument4 has been completely disregarded by Haase. Again, she offers no authority or 
analysis. 
Also disingenuous is the assertion of Haase that it was necessary to refer to the Day 
Spring treatment records in order to impeach the Hospital CEO. Reply Brief at 24. The Day 
Spring records were not used to impeach Mr. Perry. The section of the transcript to which 
Haase refers is a record of the plaintiffs questioning of Mr. Perry at trial regarding when he 
first became aware that Dr. Hawkes had gone to the Day Spring Program. Transcript at 197, 
4
 "Had the Court made its ruling before Dr. Pasternak testified, the Hospital could 
have challenged that portion of the foundation for his opinion. The delay in that critical 
ruling deprived the Hospital of that challenged. Had a challenge to the foundation for Dr. 
Pasternak's opinion been sustained, it is likely that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion. Allowing the jury to hear testimony from Dr. Pasternak and from Haase 
about these records before ruling on their admissibility was prejudicial error." Appellee's 
Brief at 26. 
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lines 8-25 and at 198, lines 1-3. Mr. Perry testified that when he was deposed in November 
of 2001 he had no memory of ever being aware that Dr. Hawkes had been to Day Spring, but 
that when he had an opportunity following his deposition to review private notes that he kept 
his memory was refreshed. Id. Haase mischaracterizes the record when she says "he 
eventually admitted he had learned of the surgeon's Day Spring stay... and that was contrary 
to his deposition testimony." Reply Brief at 24. The question at issue was when Mr. Perry 
knew that Dr. Hawkes went to the Day Spring Program, and Mr. Perry answered that 
question and clarified his deposition testimony as a lack of memory subsequently refreshed 
by his own notes. The Day Spring records were not required, nor did Haase use them in this 
instance, to impeach Mr. Perry. 
Haase incorrectly asserts that the Hospital offered no specific citation of prejudicial 
error in discussing the content of records, and she incorrectly asserts that she was required 
to use the records in order to impeach a witness. This is the total substance of her reply to 
the Hospital's argument, and it is inadequate. 
ANSWER TO NEW ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Haase offers four new arguments in her reply brief. These are original appellate 
issues for her, not responses to arguments raised by the Hospital. The Hospital filed 
separately a Motion to Strike and supporting memorandum, the arguments of which are 
incorporated here by reference to the extent not explicitly repeated. The following answers 
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to these new appellate issues are proffered for consideration only if the Court declines to 
grant the Motion to strike the new arguments and wishes argument on the new claims.5 
With respect to each of the four new issues, the Hospital objects to their consideration 
the grounds that they do not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. A more detailed 
argument is provided in the Memorandum in Support of the Hospital's Motion to Strike, 
incorporated here by reference, but the following summary of the objection to the legal 
insufficiency of the new arguments is offered for the convenience of the Court. 
The four new arguments fail to comply with the requirement of Rule 24(a)(5) in that 
there is no citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court or, in 
the alternative, an explicit statement "of grounds for seeking review on an issue not preserved 
in the trial court." Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 234 (Utah 1998) 
(citing Rule 24(a)(5)). See a]so, Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1984) 
(matters asserted for the first time on appeal are rejected). For an issue to be reviewed on 
appeal, there must be "a contemporaneous objection or some other form of preservation of 
a claimed error" as part of the trial court record. State v. Laffertv, 20 P.3d 342, 370 (Utah 
2001). 
The four new arguments also fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 24(a)(9) 
for adequate citation to, and meaningful analysis of, relevant authorities. Rule 24(a)(9) 
5
 The page limitations of Rule 24(g) do not contemplate space for answering new 
issues in reply briefs, nor do they offer any guidance on this question. The Hospital's 
reply to Haase's answer is within the page limit of the Rules. The Hospital assumes that a 
motion to file an over-length reply is not required, under the circumstances, for pages 
needed to answer new arguments. 
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"unambiguously" requires "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
upon." Associated General Contractors v. Department of Natural Resources, 38 P.3d 29 L 
303 (Utah 2001) (citing Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9)). Moreover, it is not enough just to provide 
citations to authority, appellants must provide "development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority." State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 1999) (citing 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). Briefs which lack meaningful analysis of 
authority are inadequate and will not be considered. 973 P.2d at 410. See also. State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1998) (contentions not supported by legal analysis and 
relevant authority must be disregarded). The Supreme Court of Utah has consistently 
declined to address arguments not adequately briefed. Water & Energy Systems Technology, 
Inc. v. KeiL 48 P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2002) (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 
(Utah 1998)). 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO 
ADMIT THE DAY SPRING EVALUATION RECORDS. 
Haase offers no authority nor any legal analysis for her conclusory assertion that the 
trial court should have admitted the records of Dr. Hawkes' evaluation at the Day Spring 
Program. 
As her only proffer of authority, Haase quotes from a document which was not 
admitted or discussed at trial, a document which she misrepresents as an authorization from 
Dr. Hawkes to the Hospital granting permission to review his medical records. The 
document in question, provided by Haase as Addendum 3 to her Reply Brief, is a copy of a 
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form sent to the Hospital from Intermountain Health Care requesting information regarding 
Thomas Hawkes, M.D., related to his application for participation in the Intermountain 
Health Care hospital network. The form confers no such authorization upon Ashley Valley 
Medical Center. 
The trial court was correct in declining to admit the records, and should have gone 
further in declining to allow a discussion of the content of those records, but as a threshold 
argument Haase fails to comply with the requirements for preservation of the issue and for 
adequate briefing. Her argument should be rejected. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT THE TESTIMONY OF DR. RAYMOND 
MIDDLETON FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING HIS 
ENTRIES IN DR. HAWKES' DAY SPRING RECORDS. 
Haase asserts error in the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. Raymond 
Middleton, a physician whose involvement with Thomas Hawkes, M.D., is reflected in the 
excluded Day Spring records. Reply Brief at 29. Haase offers no citation to the record 
indicating that the issue was preserved in the trial court nor a statement of grounds for review 
notwithstanding the failure to preserve the issue in the trial court. Matters not properly 
preserved at trial will be rejected on appeal. 690 P.2d at 559. 
In addition to her failure to show by citation to the record that the issue was properly 
preserved, Haase fails to provide meaningful analysis of relevant authority. Indeed, she 
offers no authority for this assertion of error, neither statute nor case. She offers only two 
paragraphs of citations to Dr. Middleton's deposition transcript and one paragraph of 
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conclusory assertions. Reply Brief at 29-30. There is no analysis of the Court's articulated 
basis for its ruling, a basis which is available in the record and could have been discussed. 
As the records were not admitted, testimony from a physician regarding notes he made 
in the record should not have been admitted. There was no error. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO 
ALLOW AN ASSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Haase asserts error in the decision of the trial court not to allow punitive damages. 
Reply Brief at 31. Haase offers no citation to the record indicating that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court nor a statement of grounds for review notwithstanding the failure 
to preserve the issue in the trial court. Matters not properly preserved at trial will be rejected 
on appeal. 690 P.2d at 559. 
In addition to the failure to show that the issue was properly preserved, Haase fails to 
provide meaningful analysis of relevant authority. Indeed, she offers no authority for her 
claim that the trial court erred in declining to allow punitive damages. She begins by arguing 
that the trial court rejection of punitive damages is a directed verdict and should be analyzed 
as such. Reply Brief at 31. She offers no authority and no analysis in support of this 
assertion. She then offers a precis of the Utah punitive damages statute followed by two 
pages of hyperbole and self-serving citations to the record. Reply Brief at 32-33. She offers 
no case law, however, establishing that the "facts" she proffers, even if true, would be 
grounds for punitive damages. 
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For example, she argues that 15 "red flags" of a "dangerously impaired surgeon" were 
admitted into evidence. Reply Brief at 33. As examples of these indicators, Haase asserts 
that Dr. Hawkes had been sued for malpractice, had been treated for pain and sleep 
deprivation in 1995, had disagreements with some orthopedic colleagues, and had financial 
difficulty. She also repeats her thematic reference to an incident in which Dr. Hawkes was 
felt by one witness to be inebriated at a high school football game. Reply Brief at 33 
(referencing Addendum 1 to Haase' Reply Brief). 
These are "facts" in the sense that they are accurate statements, but no witness 
testified that these particular facts, alone or taken together, establish that Dr. Hawkes was a 
dangerously impaired surgeon, nor did any witness testify that the Hospital's action or 
inaction with respect to any of these issues evidences reckless disregard for Mrs. Haase or 
any other patient. There was no basis for awarding punitive damages. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECOGNIZING 
THE PEER REVIEW AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 
PRIVILEGE CONFERRED UPON HOSPITALS BY THE 
UTAH LEGISLATURE. 
Haase claims error in the trial court's recognition of the statutory peer review 
privilege. Reply Brief at 34-36. She asserts a distinction between "fitness" and 
"performance" as the definitional distinction between credentialing and peer review. Reply 
Brief at 34. As with the proceeding three issues, however, Haase offers no authority for that 
argument. She asserts, with no authority or analysis, that the peer review privilege "is to 
protect the care provider whose performance is under review by his peers" and that the peer 
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review privilege ends with the death of a physician reviewed. Reply Brief at 36. With no 
citation to authority supporting her argument and no meaningful analysis of authority, her 
brief on this issue is inadequate and should be disregarded. 
Haase cites, with no reference to the page numbers she considers relevant and no 
analysis, Benson ex rel v. IHC Hosps (sic), 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993). As elsewhere in her 
brief, Haase cites here as supporting authority a case that directly contradicts her argument. 
She argues that the privilege "is to protect the care provider whose performance is under 
review." Reply Brief at 36. 
To the contrary, Benson clearly states the privilege is "to protect health care providers 
who furnish information regarding the quality of health care rendered by any individual or 
facility..." LI at 539-540 (quoting U.C.A. §58-12-43(7)). Clearly, the rationale is the need 
to protect the physicians who review their peers, not the physician who is the individual 
rendering health care. 
Haase also fails to acknowledge that in 1996 the Utah Legislature, in response to 
Benson, corrected ambiguity regarding the privilege, repealing § 58-12-43(7) and revising 
§ 26-25-1 et seq, including the privilege itself at § 26-25-3 (1996). From 1996 to the present, 
that statute has defined the privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
As to her answer to arguments presented in the Hospital's initial brief, Haase fails in 
each case to offer meaningful analysis of authority contradicting the Hospital's arguments. 
Indeed, she does not counter the Hospital's legal analysis at any point. She does not 
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contradict, or even discuss, a single case offered by the Hospital. Such an answer is legally 
inadequate and should be disregarded. 
As to the new arguments Haase attempts to offer in her Reply Brief, the Hospital 
reiterates its objection to that attempt on the grounds that the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
do not allow presenting original appellate arguments in stages. Moreover, even if such an 
approach were allowed, Haase is still required to comply with other provisions of the Rules 
for preserving issues and for adequate briefing. In each of her new arguments, she fails to 
do so. All of the new arguments presented in her Reply Brief should be stricken and 
disregarded. 
DATED this IS day of February, 2003. 
SNOW. CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert R. Harrison V 
David W. Slagle 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORI HAASE, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Appellant and 
Cross Appellee, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER and COLUMBIA ASHLEY 
VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER and 
JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1 
THROUGH 10, 
Case No. 20020524-CA 
Eighth Judicial District Court 
No. 98-0800377 
Defendants/Appellees, 
and Cross Appellant. 
Appellee/Cross Appellant Ashley Valley Medical Center hereby files its 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of Appellant's Reply Brief. 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTUAL GROUNDS 
Appellant/Cross Appellee Lori Haase ("Haase") filed a motion for permission to 
file an over-length reply memorandum on January 06, 2003. Appellee/Cross Appellant 
Ashley Valley Medical Center ("the Hospital") filed a memorandum in opposition to that 
motion on January 10, 2003, on the grounds that Haase requested the additional pages not 
for an over-length reply but rather to argue additional issues in her appeal. The Court, by 
order dated January 14, 2003, allowed Haase to file the entire brief and instructed the 
Hospital to file a motion to strike any portions to which it objected. 
Haase submitted her reply, including four issues not argued in her original brief, 
on January 16, 2003. Although Haase asserts that she "reserved" the right to argue the 
new issues for the first time in her reply, there is no provision in the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure allowing an appellant to delay arguing issues until her reply to the 
appellee's answer to her original brief. There is no case law supporting or implying such 
an interpretation of the Rules. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
With this motion, the Hospital asks the Court to strike the four new arguments on 
the grounds of failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The new arguments should be stricken because they may not be 
presented in a reply brief. Even if it were permissible to brief new issues in a reply, the 
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briefing of these issues does not comply with the Rule 24 because Haase fails to show 
that the issues were preserved and fails to offer meaningful analysis of relevant authority. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NEW ARGUMENTS IN THE HAASE REPLY SHOULD BE 
STRICKEN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE NOT 
ARGUED IN HER ORIGINAL BRIEF. 
In her original brief, Haase identified several issues which she "wishes to preserve 
her right" to argue in her reply brief. Haase Brief at 2-3. Her original brief offers no 
authority for any such right. In her reply, she offers argument on four of those issues. 
Reply Brief at 25-36. Nothing in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or in the case 
law allows an appellant to raise new appellate issues in a reply to the appellee's answer. 
Haase offers no citation to a provision in the Rules for such a right nor any case law 
implying such a right. 
To the contrary, the Rules explicitly limit reply briefs "to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief." Utah R.App.P. 24(c). Any attempt to broaden that 
limit violates accepted rules of construction. 
Utah jurisprudence has long recognized the maxim expressio, unius est exclusio 
alterius, the canon of construction under which the expression of one thing excludes 
others. Field v. Boy en 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-1087 (Utah 1998 ) (Russon, dissenting) 
(citing Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 855 (Utah 1994)). Following this canon of 
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construction, the express limitation of Rule 24(c) to "answering any new matter" raised in 
the appellee's response excludes the introduction of new arguments by the appellant in a 
reply brief. 
Although there appear to be no cases which address the precise approach Haase 
attempts, this Court has consistently rejected consideration of issues raised for the first 
time in a reply brief. In Re Adoption of S.L.F.. 27 P.3d 583, 587 n.l (Utah App. 
2001)(quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Constr.. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 575 n.3 (Utah 
App. 1994))(quoting State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah App. 
1993))("The rule is well settled that the court will not consider issues raised for the first 
time in a reply brief"). 
The clear intent of Rule 24(a) is that an appellant will present all of that party's 
contentions on appeal in the original appellate brief. 860 P.2d at 1003-1004 ("It is the 
responsibility of the moving party to raise in its . . . motion all of the issues on which it 
believes it is entitled to [prevail].")(emphasis in the original)(quoting White v. Kent 
Medical Ctr. Inc.. 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. App. 1991)). 
Additional authority supports the Hospital's position that issues not argued in 
Haase' original appellate brief should be "deemed waived and abandoned." Rukavina v. 
Triatlantic Ventures. Inc.. 931 P.2d 122,125 (Utah 1997). In Rukavina. the Utah Supreme 
Court made clear that the argument section of a party's brief must contain the contentions 
of the appellant. kL (quoting American Towers Ass'n. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical. Inc.. 930 
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P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996) (citing Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 
P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991)). 
Pixton cited an Alaska case for the proposition that "points initially raised on 
appeal but not briefed are considered abandoned." 809 P.2d at 751 (citing Union Oil of 
Calif v. State, 677 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Alaska 1984)). Though the associated citations 
were omitted by the Court of Appeals in its opinion, Union Oil cites Wetzler v. Wetzler. 
570 P.2d 741, 742 n.2 (Alaska 1977). Wetzler cites Kupka v. Morev. 541 P.2d 740 
(Alaska 1975), in which the rule subsequently articulated in Pixton was applied in the 
context of new arguments presented in a reply brief. 
In Kupka, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected new arguments submitted in a reply 
brief notwithstanding related references in the opening brief. 541 P.2d at 747. Although 
Kupka doesn't reveal whether the appellant made a similar assertion of having "reserved" 
the right to argue the issues later, the facts are nevertheless substantially the same as those 
now before the Court and, consistent with its earlier reliance on the Union Oil line of 
cases, the Court should reject Haase' new arguments. 
Consistent with Rule 24(j), any portion of a reply brief which exceeds the 
limitations of Rule 24(c) may be stricken upon motion. State v. Kruger, 6 P.3d 1116, 
1120 (Utah 2000). All new issues argued in Haase' reply brief should be stricken. 
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II. 
THE NEW ISSUES RAISED BY HAASE SHOULD BE 
STRICKEN ON THE GROUNDS THAT SHE FAILS TO 
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR APPELLATE 
ARGUMENT. 
Although the Hospital asserts that the four new arguments should be stricken 
because they were not presented in the original brief, even if that were not the rule of law 
the arguments fail to comply with Rule 24(a) and should be stricken as inadequate. 
The four new arguments fail to comply with the requirement of Rule 24(a)(5) in 
that there is no citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court or, in the alternative, an explicit statement "of grounds for seeking review on an 
issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 
228, 234 (Utah 1998) (citing Rule 24(a)(5)). See also, Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 
558, 559 (Utah 1984) (matters asserted for the first time on appeal are rejected). For an 
issue to be reviewed on appeal, there must be "a contemporaneous objection or some 
other form of preservation of a claimed error" as part of the trial court record. State v. 
Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 370 (Utah 2001). 
Haase offers no form of preservation of the claimed errors at trial, and no 
argument that she be allowed to appeal issues not properly preserved. Her arguments do 
not comply with Rule 24(a)(5) and should be stricken. 
The four new arguments also fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 24(a)(9) 
for adequate citation to, and meaningful analysis of, relevant authorities. In addition to 
being properly before the appellate court through proper preservation, arguments must be 
adequately briefed. The Supreme Court of Utah has consistently declined to address 
arguments not adequately briefed. Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil 48 
P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2002) (quoting State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has repeatedly admonished counsel to comply with 
Rule 24(a)(9) which "unambiguously" requires "citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied upon." Associated General Contractors v. Department of 
Natural Resources. 38 P.3d 291, 303 (Utah 2001) (citing Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9)). 
Moreover, it is not enough just to provide citations to authority, appellants must provide 
"development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. 
Jaeger. 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 1999) (citing State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998)). Briefs which lack meaningful analysis of authority are inadequate and will not be 
considered. 973 P.2d at 410. See also, State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1998) 
(contentions not supported by legal analysis and relevant authority must be disregarded). 
The rule in Utah is clear as to both points: (1) appellants must cite to the record 
showing the preservation of issues for review, or present argument as to why issues not 
preserved should be reviewed, and (2) to be adequate, an appellate argument must include 
meaningful analysis of relevant authority. Noncompliant aspects of each of the four new 
arguments from Haase are set forth below. 
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1. Haase asserts error in the trial court's refusal to allow admission of Day 
Spring records. Reply Brief at 25. Haase offers no citation to the record indicating that 
the issue was preserved in the trial court nor a statement of grounds for review 
notwithstanding the failure to preserve the issue in the trial court. Matters not properly 
preserved at trial will be rejected on appeal. 690 P.2d at 559. 
In addition to the failure to show that the issue was properly preserved below, 
Haase fails to provide meaningful analysis of relevant authority. Indeed, she offers no 
authority for this assertion of error, neither statute nor case. She offers only a conclusory 
criticism of the basis for the Court's decision, Reply Brief at 25, and provides, as a full-
page footnote, a quotation from a document which is not even what she proffers it to be.1 
2. Haase asserts error in the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. 
Raymond Middleton, a physician whose involvement with Thomas Hawkes, M.D., is 
reflected in the excluded Day Spring records. Reply Brief at 29. Haase offers no citation 
to the record indicating that the issue was preserved in the trial court nor a statement of 
grounds for review notwithstanding the failure to preserve the issue in the trial court. 
Matters not properly preserved at trial will be rejected on appeal. 690 P.2d at 559. 
1
 The document in question, provided by Haase as Addendum 3, is a copy of a 
form request sent to the Hospital from Intermountain Health Care for information 
regarding Thomas Hawkes, M.D., related to his application for participation in the 
Intermountain Health Care hospital network. Haase describes it as an authorization from 
Dr. Hawkes to Ashley Valley Medical Center allowing the Hospital to inquire into his 
medical records. 
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In addition to her failure to show by citation to the record that the issue was 
properly preserved, Haase fails to provide meaningful analysis of relevant authority. 
Indeed, she offers no authority for this assertion of error, neither statute nor case. She 
offers only two paragraphs of citations to Dr. Middleton's deposition transcript and one 
paragraph of conclusory assertions. Reply Brief at 29-30. There is no analysis of the 
Court's articulated basis for its ruling, a basis which is available in the record and could 
have been discussed. 
3. Haase asserts error in the decision of the trial court not to allow punitive 
damages. Reply Brief at 31. Haase offers no citation to the record indicating that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court nor a statement of grounds for review 
notwithstanding the failure to preserve the issue at trial. Matters not properly preserved at 
trial will be rejected on appeal. 690 P.2d at 559. 
In addition to the failure to show that the issue was properly preserved, Haase fails 
to provide meaningful analysis of relevant authority. Indeed, she offers no authority for 
her claim that the trial court erred in declining to allow punitive damages, nor even any 
authority establishing that punitive damages are available in an action for negligence in 
credentialing a physician.2 
2
 Punitive damages are not available in all causes of action. See, e.g., Norman v. 
Arnold, 2002 UT 81, 453 Utah Adv. Reports 457 (punitive damages not available in 
breach of contract). 
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She begins by arguing that the trial court rejection of punitive damages is 
essentially a directed verdict and should be analyzed as such, Reply Brief at 31, but offers 
no authority and no analysis in support of this assertion. She then offers a two-line precis 
of the Utah punitive damages statute followed by two pages of hyperbole and 
misrepresentation.3 Reply Brief at 32-33. She offers no case law, however, establishing 
that the "facts" she proffers, even if true, would be grounds for punitive damages. 
Haase completely fails to meet the requirement for reasoned analysis of relevant 
authority and her argument should be stricken. 48 P.3d at 894. 
4. Haase claims error in the trial court's recognition of the statutory peer 
review privilege. Reply Brief at 34-36. She asserts a distinction between "fitness" and 
"performance" as the definitional distinction between credentialing and peer review. 
Reply Brief at 34. Haase offers no authority for that argument. She then asserts, with no 
authority,4 that the peer review privilege "is to protect the care provider whose 
performance is under review by his peers" and that the peer review privilege ends with 
the death of a physician reviewed. Reply Brief at 36. As there is no meaningful analysis 
3
 For example, Haase asserts "[Tjhere is strong evidence that the hospital placed 
profits before patients . . . ." Reply Brief at 32. She offers no citation to any such 
evidence, however, only a speculative quotation from her own closing argument. Id, 
4
 Although the hospital is not responding to the merits of the Haase arguments in 
this motion to strike, the attention of the Court is invited to the fact that the argument here 
cannot be supported by authorities because the authorities are to the contrary. 
m 
of, or citation to, relevant authority, her brief on this issue is inadequate and should be 
disregarded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure make no provision for, nor does any case 
law suggest an implied provision for, a reservation of the right in an appellant's brief to 
make additional original arguments in a reply to the appellee's answer. Haase offers no 
authority in support of her attempt to present appellate issues in stages. Her attempt to 
include new issues in her reply is inconsistent with the Rules and with prior decisions of 
this Court, and should fail. 
Even if there were an implied provision for reserving the briefing of original issues 
until submission of a reply brief, the briefing of new issues by Haase in her reply is 
inadequate. For each of the four new issues, she fails to show that the issues were 
preserved at trial, and offers no meaningful analysis of relevant authority. Her briefing on 
these issues should be stricken. 
Ashley Valley Medical Center's motion to strike all new arguments, found on 
pages 25 through 36 of the Reply Brief, should be granted.5 
5
 The Reply Brief sets forth arguments regarding the four new issues at pages 25 
through 36. That section of the brief is identified as Section One, but it appears that the 
proper identification would have been Section Two. Because of this misidentification, 
the Hospital refers to the pages rather than the section headings. 
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DATED this / < day of February, 2003. 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Wrc,-%r*9lyc*j?J?i. 
Rooert R. Harrison 
Attorneys for Ashley Valley Medical Center 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I state that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendants herein; that 1 served the attached MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF (Case Number 20020524-CA, in the Utah Court of Appeals) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on the / g day of 
February, 2003. 
N \10749\I51\appeal\Memo Supporting Motion to Strike wpd 
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